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Abstract 
Self-reported health complaints result from a complex integration of interoceptive 
(bottom-up) information emerging from peripheral physiological activity with (top-down) 
perceptual-cognitive and affective processes. Interoceptive signals have to be sensed, 
perceived, attended to, appreciated and interpreted, put into language and expressed, mostly in 
a social context. In this chapter, we will discuss the role of perceptual and attentional 
processes, anticipation, symptom schemata and illness beliefs, emotion and personality, and 
memory processes. Their role may importantly influence the relationship between indicators 
of peripheral physiological activity and self-reported health complaints.  
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Interoception and symptom perception 
 
Although all self-reported health complaints are the result of processes in the brain, a general 
assumption is that they accurately reflect dysfunctional processes in the peripheral body. The 
afferent or sensory processes transmitting information from the body to the brain can be 
called interoception. However, although interoception and symptom perception are related 
processes, they are not the same.   
 
Interoception 
Interoception is poorly defined and several definitions are used. Some equalize it 
rather narrowly with visceroception (Dworkin, 2000), whereas others (Craig, 2004) also 
include proprioception and somatoception (the perception of stimuli interacting with the body 
surface). Still others conceive of interoception more broadly as a meta-representation of the 
body’s state allowing the brain to distinguish the inner from the outer world (Mosely et al., 
2012).  
Recent neurobiological research has shown that sensations from within the body, such 
as hunger, thirst, stomach cramps, fullness, rectal urgency, temperature, itch, muscle ache, 
dyspnea, pain, etc. are processed in a shared evolutionarily ancient neural pathway that serves 
to maintain the integrity of the body or, in other words, homeostasis. Several comprehensive 
reviews (Craig, 2002, 2004) suggest that interoceptive pathways include a sensory branch 
carrying signals to the lamina I and the medullary nucleus of the solitary tract, which are (in 
humans) integrated in the parabrachial nucleus to travel via parallel ascending pathways to the 
ventromedial thalamic nuclei further to the mid/posterior insular cortex, in which a modality-
selective representation is produced underlying distinctive sensations.  
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Via ascending afferent pathways providing a direct thalamo-cortical connection to the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), interoceptive sensations also become endowed with 
affective-motivational value (e.g. unpleasantness). The interoceptive image is further re-
represented in the right anterior insula, which is also involved in subjective awareness of 
feelings and emotions. This process of re-representing progresses from the posterior to the 
anterior parts implies a successively increasing “integration of homeostatic, environmental, 
hedonic, motivational, social and cognitive activity to produce a ‘global emotional moment’, 
which represents the sentient self” (Craig, 2009, p. 67). This allows for a bi-directional 
influence of emotion and interoception (Critchley et al., 2001; Zaki et al., 2012). For example, 
accurate cardiac perception is associated with more intense emotional experience (Herbert et 
al., 2010), and state negative affect enhances the activation of the right anterior insula and the 
dorsal ACC (Mayer et al., 2006). The ACC has further strong interconnections with cortical 
prefrontal (PFC) regions as well as strong descending projections, particularly to the peri-
aquaductal gray (PAG) and the brainstem, allowing for top-down facilitatory and inhibitory 
modulation on interoception from higher cortical regions (Mayer et al., 2006). Top-down 
modulatory processes may go as far as to influence neural activity at the level of the spinal 
cord (Eippert et al., 2009).  
This short neurobiological account shows that there is room for multiple top-down 
processes to modulate the experience of sensations from the body and different functional 
aspects of interoception (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013) have been distinguished. For example, 
on both neurobiological and functional grounds, a distinction can be made between 
interoceptive accuracy, which refers to the ability to accurately perceive one’s own internal 
activity, and interoceptive or body awareness, which refers to the state of being cognizant, 
mindful of one’s own internal state (Khalsa et al., 2008; 2009; Ceunen, Van Diest & Vlaeyen, 
2013). Interestingly, heightened body awareness can be both adaptive and maladaptive for 
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perceived health (Mehling et al., 2009), whereas evidence shows that elevated symptom 
reporting may be related to reduced interoceptive accuracy (see further).  
 
Symptom perception 
Symptom perception can be defined as the process of becoming aware of bodily 
dysfunction. Although symptom perception can theoretically be distinguished from symptom 
reporting or self-reported health complaints, these concepts are often used interchangeably. 
Perceived internal sensations turn into health complaints when they become endowed with 
negative affective value and become part of a meaning network associated with potential 
threat to the integrity of the body. In this respect, bodily symptoms can be conceived of as 
“homeostatic emotions” (Craig, 2003): they involve a sensory component serving the 
experience of intensity, location and other qualities of internal sensations, and an affective-
motivational component providing the drive for behavioral action to promote survival. 
Accurate and aware perception of bodily dysfunction may, therefore, be considered the 
behavioral layer in a hierarchical defense system to protect the integrity of the body: the 
behavioral action system is engaged when automatic, more local, automatic and reflexive 
regulatory systems within the body fail. For example, the experience of breathlessness 
interrupts ongoing activities, rearranges processing priorities and is associated with a 
compelling drive to gasp, opening the window and/or fleeing from closed places to 
compensate for inaccurate automatic regulation of blood gases.  
The process of becoming aware of bodily dysfunction typically includes putting 
perceived sensations into words, which are part of, or constitute, meaning networks. The 
semantics of symptom words are particularly relevant for symptom assessments. Most 
questionnaires use a variety of symptom words, which are clustered according to 
physiological systems, such as cardiorespiratory and gastrointestinal symptoms. However, 
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other relevant underlying aspects in symptom reporting tend to be overlooked and more 
sophisticated analyses of dimensions underlying somatic symptom reporting are needed (see 
Jasper et al., 2012). Indeed, items used in assessment instruments may differ according to 
other aspects as well. Some inquire about a mere sensory aspect (e.g. fast/deep breathing), 
while other items also probe an implicit appraisal of its unpleasantness (i.e. “breathlessness”). 
Both aspects can reliably be distinguished (von Leupoldt et al., 2006; Wan et al., 2009), but 
individuals differ in how they intuitively integrate both components (Petersen et al., 2011). 
Several other relevant dimensions can be distinguished, such as the extent to which a 
symptom word refers to a specific location in the body or to a systemic state (compare “tooth 
ache” with “tiredness”) and the probability of a symptom to be life threatening (compare 
“running nose” with “blood in stools”), etc. Few studies have looked at the role of 
psychological processes to select or endorse particular wordings to describe one’s own 
internal state (but see Van Diest et al., 2005).   
Just like any other type of information entering conscious awareness, information from 
within the body is sensitive to modulation by functional psychological processes. The seminal 
work of Pennebaker (1982) on the psychology of physical symptoms introduced most 
processes elaborated on in later, more detailed models. These processes include attention, 
expectation, memory, attributions and illness beliefs, emotions and personality (Rief & 
Broadbent, 2007). In the following we will discuss a number of relevant psychological 
processes and how they influence symptom perception. Although several processes are 
discussed separately, it should be clear that they are mutually interacting to construct a unified 
somatic experience for the “sentient self”.  
 
Psychological modulation of symptom perception 
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Perception and attention 
Critical dimensions for symptom perception are intensity and location of interoceptive 
stimulation. A general rule seems to be that psychological modulation of bodily symptom 
perception is less pronounced when the interoceptive stimulation is intense and unambiguous 
in time (on/off) and location. In these conditions, a rather direct relationship between the 
interoceptive stimulation and symptom reports exists (Stegen et al., 1998; Put et al., 2004; 
Martin, Rothrock, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2003). Most often, however, interoceptive 
information is low to mildly intense and has no clear spatial and/or temporal boundaries, 
particularly when the physiological dysfunction is systemic. In such conditions, attention 
seems to play an important role. Attention, a process involving the allocation of processing 
resources to stimuli, typically amplifies psychophysiological and behavioral responses to 
attended stimuli, whereas distraction from these stimuli reduces such responses (Bushnell et 
al., 1999). Attentional focus can result from local, bottom-up stimulus characteristics (e.g. 
novelty) or from top-down processes, such as anticipation.  
Two important questions emerge as regards attention and symptom perception: is 
attention “directed inwards” influencing the number and intensity of perceived bodily 
symptoms, and is it influencing the accuracy of symptom perception (defined as the within-
subject correspondence between physiological and self-reported changes)? As to the first 
question, direct manipulations of attention to the body and studies assessing body awareness 
generally show that attention focused on the body enhances the sensitivity to interoceptive 
stimulation and increases symptom reports. This has been documented by studies on tactile 
stimulation (Mirams et al., 2012), respiration (Stegen et al., 2001), pain (Villemure & 
Bushnell, 2009), itch (Van Laarhoven, et al., 2010), dyspnea (von Leupoldt et al., 2007), and 
general symptom reporting (Verkuil et al., 2007). Interestingly, not just symptom reports but 
also objective cough frequency is enhanced by focusing attention on internal sensations (Van 
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den Bergh et al., 2012). Consistent with such findings, it has been shown that performance on 
concurrent cognitive tasks is disrupted as a result of attentional resources being consumed by 
noticing interoceptive stimulation (Stegen et al., 2001; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). 
Conversely, distraction from bodily sensations generally reduces the perceived intensity of 
interoceptive stimulation and symptom reports (Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980; Coen et al., 
2008; Accarino et al., 1997). The role of attention for symptom reports has been captured in 
the “cue-competition hypothesis” (Pennebaker, 1982), assuming that the amount of 
interoceptive information reaching awareness is a function of the ratio between the amount of 
interoceptive and exteroceptive information. Findings that persons living in boring 
environments tend to report more symptoms than persons living in rich and stimulating 
environments are in line with this hypothesis.   
As to the second question, evidence suggests that an interoceptive attentional focus is 
not necessarily associated with better interoceptive accuracy, but rather with a tendency to 
overestimate the intensity of somatic sensations. In a study applying low intensity tactile 
stimuli, it was shown that a more liberal response criterion was used when attention was 
directed inwards, leading to more false positives (Mirams et al., 2012). Some groups, such as 
persons with high trait negative affectivity (NA) who tend to focus attention inwards during a 
physiological challenge (Stegen et al., 2001), report more symptoms which are less closely 
related to the induced physiological changes (Van den Bergh et al., 2004; Bogaerts et al., 
2005). Also persons with somatoform disorders, who are typically preoccupied with 
sensations in the body, reported more symptoms as shown by their interoceptive accuracy to 
be lower (Schaefer et al., 2012) compared to healthy controls.  
An as yet unresolved question is whether the emotional significance of an 
interoceptive sensation interacts with its sensory processing. Substantial evidence shows that 
the amygdala serves as a “neurological hub” swiftly assessing the emotional value of 
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exteroceptive sensory events and subsequently enhancing perceptual processing in early 
sensory pathways through connections with sensory areas in more distant cortical regions 
(Pourtois et al., 2013). Claims are made that similar attentional prioritization and subsequent 
enhancement of processing occurs for potentially noxious stimuli in the “peripersonal space” 
(the body and the space surrounding it) (Legrain et al., 2011), but it is not known whether 
similar mechanisms operate when processing stimuli originating from within the body. 
 
Anticipation, symptom schemata and illness beliefs 
A wealth of evidence on placebo and nocebo documents the dramatic effects of 
expectations on symptom perception and reporting. Anticipation can be induced either by 
classical conditioning, verbal instructions and all kinds of contextual factors. It should be 
noted that conditioned placebo and nocebo effects do not necessarily depend on conscious 
expectation (Benedetti, 2013). Effects can impact the intensity, but also determine the sheer 
presence/absence of symptoms. Particularly pain analgesia has been thoroughly investigated 
and a so-called descending pain modulatory network has been described, involving prefrontal 
(DLPFC), limbic (ACC, amygdala), midbrain (PAG) and even spinal cord areas. Knowledge 
about the mechanisms involved in placebo and nocebo phenomena related to other sensations 
than pain is more sketchy, but sufficient to document the pervasive effects of anticipation on 
neurotransmitter function, including the endogenous opioid system, and on autonomic, 
endocrine, immune and motor functions (Finniss et al., 2010; Enck et al., 2013). Such 
findings show that symptom perception involves a bi-directional process without a marked 
boundary between central and peripheral processes. Bottom-up processes relay information of 
peripheral physiological activity to the brain, but cognitive processes (critically requiring the 
involvement of prefrontal areas, such as the dorsolateral PFC) in turn substantially influence 
activity in other central neurobiological and in peripheral physiological systems. These 
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specific systems may differ according to the type of placebo or nocebo response (Benedetti, 
2013).  
Symptom schemata typically result from repeated symptom episodes. It is assumed 
that the person’s history with symptoms episodes is recorded in memory and represented in 
the form of schemata, which capture the commonalities among different symptom episodes. 
Because some people had more episodes than others, while repeated symptom episodes can 
result from the same or from different health problems, symptom schemata can differ in 
complexity and coherence (Petersen et al., 2011). Symptom schemata act like perceptual 
categories: When activated or primed, a readiness to perceive an interoceptive stimulus 
configuration in a particular way is facilitated. The benefit is that less information has to be 
checked and controlled for a symptom experience to emerge, speeding up the perceptual 
process, but the ease of perception may come at a cost showing up as an elevated probability 
towards biased perception. For example, the slightest change in respiratory effort may be 
noticed by an “experienced” asthma patient, whereas the same change may not reach 
awareness of the not-yet diagnosed or novice asthma patient. Conversely, an asthma patient 
who is concerned about potential attacks may easily misperceive respiratory distress caused 
by stress-induced hyperventilation as signs of an impending attack. Even simple magnitude 
judgments of respiratory resistance and related affective and behavioral responses are affected 
by primed perceptual categories of high or low respiratory effort (Petersen et al., in press). 
Just like the perception of a chair is automatic, categorical, meaningful and con-
structive, so is symptom perception the result of similar basic and automatic perceptual-
cognitive processes. These involve a process of mapping sensory evidence on perceptual 
hypotheses, representing some kind of implicit reasoning. This was captured by Brown’s 
model when postulating a primary attentional system, PAS (Brown, 2004). In line with 
research on perception, it hypothesizes that sensory stimuli are activating perceptual 
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hypotheses in a feed-forward process and that actual information is gradually mapped onto 
them, giving rise to awareness of only this perceptual hypothesis that obtains the highest level 
of evidence (e.g. becomes a percept). The higher the activation state of symptom schemata, 
the less evidence from peripheral stimulation is needed in order to result in percepts. 
Ultimately, percepts may emerge without peripheral input at all, such as in placebo or nocebo 
symptoms, which then can be characterized as “somatovisceral illusions”. For example, when 
participants were given an air mixture to breathe for a number of times, consisting of a 
harmless odor and CO2-enriched air causing bodily symptoms, elevated symptom reports 
emerged upon subsequently breathing a mixture of the harmless odor only. These nocebo 
symptoms were similar to the symptoms originally induced by CO2-inhalation and apparently 
resulted from automatically activated symptom schemata biasing the subject’s perception of 
his/her somatic state (Van den Bergh et al., 1997; 1998).  
However, once symptoms are felt, people may contemplate upon them, link them to an 
illness label, infer potential causes, anticipate about their consequences and worry and 
ruminate about them. In other words, they develop an illness theory, elaborate on it and 
behave accordingly. The interpretation of palpitations as a symptom of an acute heart 
condition will prompt completely different behaviors compared to believing that they result 
from drinking too much coffee. This secondary process may, however, prime perceptual 
categories and modify the amount of evidence needed for a somatic percept to emerge, with 
potentially beneficial or disadvantageous outcomes. In extreme cases, chronic activation of 
perceptual hypotheses, possibly as a result of catastrophizing, worrying and ruminating, may 
contribute to somatovisceral illusions, underlying medically unexplained symptoms (see 
further).  
 
Emotion and personality 
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A robust association between symptom reporting and trait Negative Affectivity (NA) is 
consistently found (r = .40 to .50). Trait NA is a broad and stable disposition to appraise 
situations as more threatening and to experience negative mood states and emotions (Watson 
& Clark, 1984). It can be described as an over-reactive evaluative system combined with poor 
or deficient emotion regulation when processing emotional stimuli (Yiend, 2010). It appears 
to have a genetic basis, is associated with distinct brain circuit function and neurotransmitter 
activity (Hariri, 2009) and is considered a vulnerability factor for emotional disorders, such as 
anxiety and depression (Lonigan & Vasey, 2009).   
The association with symptom reporting reflects the effect of NA upon symptom 
reporting rather than vice versa (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). The association appears in 
non-consulting healthy persons (Van Diest et al., 2005), in primary care patients where 
medically unexplained symptoms co-occur with elevated anxiety and depression levels 
(Kroenke, 2003), and in patients with functional syndromes showing elevated psychiatric co-
morbidity (Wessely et al., 1999). In addition, also in known diseases a substantial correlation 
between symptom-reports and NA exists (Janssens et al., 2009), reflecting a tendency to over-
report symptoms in high NA persons. Closer inspection suggests that the depressive 
component of NA is mainly associated with “over-reporting” of past symptoms, whereas the 
anxiety component is more related to excessive reporting of concurrent symptoms (Suls & 
Howren, 2012). Also, not all symptoms are associated with NA. Van Diest et al. (2005) 
investigated the relationship between 73 individual symptoms and NA in a large healthy 
sample and found a wide variability (r’s .0 to .45), which could be explained by two factors, 
namely severity (whether a symptom was potentially life-threatening) and “somatic versus 
psychological” (whether a symptom was vague and possibly associated with anxiety; e.g. 
compare “stuffed nose” versus “loosing contact with reality”).  
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Interestingly, also state negative affect impacts symptom perception. When presenting 
unpleasant emotional cues during experimentally induced bodily sensations, like pain (de 
Wied & Verbaten, 2001; Meagher et al., 2001), dyspnea (Von Leupoldt, Mertz, Kegat, 
Burmester & Dahme, 2006) or esophageal stimulation (Philips et al., 2003), symptom reports 
are more elevated. Even very short presentations of unpleasant pictures can result in increased 
symptom reports, particularly in persons with high habitual symptom levels, and/or high 
negative affect (Bogaerts et al., 2005; 2008; 2010; Constantinou et al., 2013) and in patients 
with functional syndromes (Montoya et al., 2005). 
Several hypotheses have been advanced to understand this relationship. One idea is that 
persons with NA and/or during negative affective states have higher levels of sympathetic 
activity, which would translate into elevated self-reported symptoms. However, several 
extensive laboratory and ambulatory studies have not been able to document significant 
differences in a wide variety of peripheral physiological stress or arousal indicators (Houtveen 
& Van Doornen, 2007). Recent studies are inspired by the hypothesis that inflammatory load 
and immune-related mechanisms are involved and that the relationship between negative 
emotional states and elevated symptom reports results from stress-related sensitization of the 
brain-immune communication, but only scanty evidence exists so far in support of this idea 
(Lacourt et al., 2013; Lacourt, 2013).  
Another idea emphasizes attentional mechanisms leading to lower perceptual thresholds 
for (normal) physiological arousal responses to enter awareness. A set of studies by Gendolla 
et al. (2005) suggested that self-focused attention in conjunction with negative mood is 
critical for elevated symptom reports to occur. The interpretation advanced for these findings 
is that attentional focus on one’s own negative mood would activate symptom schemata 
biasing reports of one’s somatic state. However, self-focused attention seems not critical: 
simply viewing pictures with negative valence also elicits elevated symptom reports in high 
 14 
NA persons (Bogaerts et al., 2010; Constantinou et al., 2013). Apparently, simply processing 
negative cues, either in the internal or the external world, triggers symptom schemata and 
makes people prone to biased symptom perception, particularly in persons with high NA.  
 
Memory 
Symptom assessments during diagnosis and treatment evaluations importantly rely on 
memory information. “How did you feel” is an often heard question in the doctor’s office, but 
also screening and assessment instruments measuring symptoms in general or related to a 
particular disease typically use retrospective frequency estimates over a long, often 
unspecified time window. Questionnaires typically require the respondent to rate a set of 
symptoms along intuitive standards such as seldom, frequent, almost daily, etc. (Zijlema et 
al., 2013). In such conditions, symptom reports are mainly based on memory of somatic 
episodes. The importance of symptom assessment being memory-based is often overlooked 
despite the fact that memory is not just storing an experience, but is actively reconstructing it. 
Only when actual symptoms are assessed (how do you feel now?), either during doctor visits 
or with (often disease-specific) questionnaires, momentary information is collected. Evidence 
suggests that even then, there is no clear one-to-one relationship between physiological 
responses and self-reported complaints (Walentinowicz et al., 2013). Increasingly, time- or 
event-related multiple momentary assessment is used to assess symptoms in daily life 
(Shiffman et al., 2008), allowing for interesting comparisons between concurrent and 
retrospective ratings spanning the same symptom episodes and assessment period.  
The majority of findings suggest a consistent overestimation of past symptoms as 
measured with global retrospective symptom ratings (Stone et al., 2004; Giske et al., 2010; 
Linton & Melin 1982; Broderick et al. 2008). However, several factors relating to 
characteristics of the symptom episodes, the duration of the recall period, the context during 
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recall and individual differences seem to moderate this overestimation, often resulting in a 
complex picture. For example, retrospective overestimation of pain was greater with lower 
initial pain, while high initial pain was associated with underestimation (Feine et al., 1998). 
Also the variability of symptoms is an important variable (Stone et al., 2005): greater 
momentary variability was associated with greater discrepancy between momentary and 
retrospective ratings and higher retrospective ratings overall. Overestimation typically also 
increases with longer recall periods (Broderick et al., 2008), although in a study recording 
physical symptoms in daily life in students, a gradual increase in overestimation of 
experienced symptoms with longer time frames was observed only among high, but not low 
habitual symptom reporters (Houtveen & Oei, 2007). Furthermore, actual state during recall 
plays a role: lower current pain intensity at the moment of recall was associated with 
underestimation of recalled pain, whereas higher current pain was associated with 
overestimation (Smith and Safer, 1993; Lefebvre & Keefe, 2002; Gendreau et al., 2003),  
A well-investigated memory bias is the so-called peak-end effect in retrospective 
evaluations. This refers to the observation that not all constituent elements of an experience 
are equally important when representing it in memory: the intensity of an experience at both 
the peak and the end receive relatively more weight as these episodes convey the most 
relevant information. The effect in symptom studies shows up as lower retrospective 
discomfort ratings when for example pain or dyspnea ended gradually at a lower discomfort 
level rather than abruptly at the peak, despite an equal level of peak discomfort and a longer 
duration of total discomfort (Kahneman et al., 1993; Bogaerts et al., 2012). Interestingly, 
patients with medically unexplained symptoms do not show this effect, suggesting substantial 
differences in the way they represent symptom episodes in memory (Bogaerts et al., 2012). 
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In general, it can be concluded that research on memory for symptoms needs more 
attention in view of its importance for diagnostic and therapeutic assessment of self-reported 
health. 
 
Medically unexplained symptoms: a symptom perception pathology?  
 
For a substantial part of the patients consulting medical doctors, no physiological 
dysfunction can be related to their health complaints. Hence, the latter are often called 
medically unexplained symptoms (MUS). The share of MUS in primary care consultations is 
estimated to range from 20% up to 50%, while prevalence rates in secondary care are even 
higher (Nimnuan et al., 2001). Typical symptoms are fatigue, weakness, headache, muscle 
aches, nausea and other gastrointestinal complaints, joint pain, palpitations, chest pain, 
dyspnea, dizziness, etc. (Barsky & Borus, 1999). In a clinical context, the symptoms often 
appear as functional syndromes, such as chronic fatigue, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel disease, 
multiple chemical sensitivity, etc. Despite specific diagnostic criteria for such syndromes, 
overlap and comorbidity between the different categories is large, leading to a debate between 
“lumpers” (who consider the different syndromes as basically identical) and “splitters” (who 
emphasize the different specificities of the syndromes) (Wessely et al., 1999; Lacourt et al., 
2013; White, 2010).  
MUS challenge the traditional disease model, which assumes a direct relationship 
between a physiological dysfunction and self-reported complaints. The absence of such a 
relationship is the source of both frustrated medical doctors and patients, it feeds somatization 
processes in the patient and leads to overuse of health care resources and puts a substantial 
burden on the health care system (Barsky et al., 2005).   
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Several strategies are followed in search of an explanation. One strategy is motivated 
by the assumption that as yet unknown (stress-related?) dysfunction in peripheral 
physiological systems and/or in their interaction with the brain, such as the immune-to-brain 
communication, is critical and that symptom reports are a true reflection of such dysfunctions. 
Several reviews revealed evidence in support of this strategy, but the critical involvement of 
specific physiological systems is overall not considered convincing enough because of the 
lack of evidence documenting the specificity, consistency and/or causal direction of the 
findings (Rief & Barsky, 2005).  Other strategies rely on the idea that the critical mechanisms 
are centrally mediated distortions in the perception of one’s bodily state. While substantial 
evidence is consistently showing distortions in perceptual-cognitive mechanisms of symptom 
perception, cause-effect relationships remain often unclear and the critical hypothesized 
mechanisms remain untested (Rief & Broadbent, 2007).  
Both strategies are neither mutually exclusive nor theoretically incompatible. The 
important advances in placebo research of the recent decade illustrate how deeply 
psychological variables, such as learning, anticipation and social context are intertwined with 
central and peripheral physiological mechanisms (Benedetti, 2013). Such advances are likely 
the prelude of a paradigm shift in which the opposition between psychological and 
physiological processes in the study of MUS is considered elusive and will be replaced by 
research and theorizing on MUS as a nocebo phenomenon, emerging from an intricately 
intertwined mind-body system. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Several processes modulate the relationship between peripheral physiologic 
dysfunction and self-reported symptoms. In extreme cases there is no link at all. This is 
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insufficiently recognized in a biomedical disease model, which assumes a direct relationship 
between peripheral dysfunction and symptom reports. A more advanced symptom model 
(Kroenke & Harris, 2001), in which both peripheral and central/psychological processes are 
included in both a diagnostic and therapeutic step, is needed to further improve health care.   
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